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INTRODUCTION 
One of the key objectives of the Union is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within 
an area of freedom, security and justice. In order to achieve this aim, Member States need to 
cooperate more closely, particularly in respect of the exchange of information between their 
competent law enforcement authorities and between them and such authorities in third 
countries.  
Issued and blank, stolen, lost or misappropriated passports are used to elude law enforcement 
with the objective of carrying out illicit activities capable of jeopardising the security of the 
Union and of each of the Member States. Meaningful action can only be taken at Union level 
by reason of the very nature of the threat. 
All Member States are affiliated to the International Criminal Police Organisation 
(“Interpol”). In order to fulfil its mission, Interpol created a l database on stolen travel 
documents (SLTD) that permits Interpol’s members to share between themselves data on lost 
and stolen passports. 
Common Position 2005/69/JHA obliges Member States to ensure that their competent law 
enforcement authorities exchange data on issued and blank passports that are stolen, lost or 
misappropriated and formatted for integration in a specific information system, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that the fundamental rights of data subjects are respected. 
1. KEY REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMON POSITION 
The Common Position stipulates 5 obligations for Member States: 
– To exchange all present and future passport data (as defined) with Interpol; 
– To ensure that such data is exchanged with Interpol immediately after it has been entered 
into the national database or SIS; 
– To only share such data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of protection 
for personal data and that respect the fundamental rights and liberties regarding the 
automatic processing of personal data; 
– To ensure that their competent law enforcement authorities use the Interpol database to 
access such information when appropriate for the performance of their task and to set up 
the required infrastructures to facilitate consultation; 
– To ensure that they take up the required action in case that a positive identification (hit) 
occurred. 
2. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT AND METHOD OF EVALUATION 
In 2006 the European Commission has submitted a report to the Council on the operation of 
the Common Position within the Member States1 ("the 2006 Report"). The 2006 Report 
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concluded that implementation of the Common Position by the Member States is still 
incomplete and made certain recommendations to the Member States. Therefore the Council 
instructed the Commission to submit a second report to assess the extent to which Member 
States have taken appropriate action in the meantime2. 
Pursuant to this task, on 1st June 2007 the Commission sent a questionnaire to the Member 
States,aimed at ascertaining the extent, mode and method of operation of the Common 
Position, as well as the improvements, if any, following the 2006 Report.  
All Member States had returned answers to this questionnaire. Some of the information 
received by the Commission was ambiguous, incomplete, makes reference to domestic law 
and other provisions without providing further details, and has been provided on the basis of 
diverging interpretations of the questions asked by the Member States. Therefore, the 
Commission invited specialists from the Member States to a meeting, aimed at clarifying the 
replies to the questionnaire and drawing conclusions from such replies. The meeting was held 
in Brussels on 17 and 18 September 2007. 
The present report provides an overview of the written replies to the questionnaire, as well as 
the oral explanations and information provided by the specialists of the Member States at the 
above meeting, and on that basis assesses the level of implementation of the Common 
Position. 
3. SUMMARY OF REPLIES 
3.1. Did your Member State implement the Common Position on exchanging certain 
data with Interpol (2005/69/JHA)? 
• If the answer is positive, in what way did your Member States implement it? 
Please transmit the relevant implementing measure where appropriate. 
• If the answer is negative, does your Member State intend to implement it? 
• For the Member States which replied to the questionnaire on the 
implementation of the Common Position which was sent in 2006, has there 
been any change to your situation during the year 2006/2007? 
The replies of the Member States to this question showed that all Member States have taken 
steps to implement the Common Position, but that implementation is at a variety of stages. 
Even though at the time of submitting their replies to the questionnaire, Latvia and Slovakia 
had not fully implemented the Common Position, they were expecting to do so by the end of 
2007.The replies demonstrate that, in general, there has been significant progress in the 
implementation and operation of the Common Position since the 2006 Report.  
3.2. Does your MS exchange all data on issued and blank passports that are stolen, 
lost and misappropriated with Interpol as required in Article 3(1) of CP 
2005/69/JHA? If your Member State does not exchange such passport data with 
Interpol, please provide some indication of an approximate percentage of such 
exchange. 
The replies indicate that 22 Member States exchange all the required passport data with 
Interpol, whilst 1 Member State will be doing so imminently. Some Member States go even 
further than the requirements of the Common Position and exchange information with 
Interpol as regards lost or stolen identity cards.  
                                                 
2 910/1/06 ENFOPOL 108 SIRIS 108, 8 June 2006 
 EN 4   EN 
The type of data that is exchanged is not always as complete as is required under the Common 
Position in 3 Member States. More specifically, Poland provides data only on passports which 
are lost or stolen as a result of crime, Hungary only on stolen passports and Portugal only on 
blank stolen documents. 
3.3. Does your MS pursuant to Art. 3 (3) of CP 2005/69/JHA exchange all passport 
data immediately also with Interpol after it has been entered in your relevant 
national database or the SIS (if your Member State participates in the latter)? 
For Member States which defer the sending of data to Interpol, please describe 
your workflows that cause the interval between the recording of data into your 
relevant database or, where relevant, into SIS and the sending to Interpol. 
Article 3(3) of the Common Position requires that the data be entered in the Interpol database 
immediately upon their entry into the national database or the SIS. It is noted that the 
Common Position does not aim to regulate the period between the reporting of the passport as 
lost and the entry of the information into the national database. 
The replies to the questionnaire indicate that only 11 Member States have achieved such 
immediate entry, while 2 Member States will be doing so once their infrastructure is 
operational. 8 Member States exchange such data with Interpol on a daily basis, which even if 
not ideal, may be an acceptable practice. Italy and Hungary exchange data on a monthly basis 
and the Czech Republic on a weekly basis. 
3.4. Does your MS distinguish between Interpol members to share this data with 
and those not to share this data with according Art. 3 (1) of the CP 
2005/69/JHA? On what grounds does your Member State decide to make such 
distinction or not? Is reciprocity a consideration? For those Member States 
which answered the questionnaire contained in the 2006 Report: did you modify 
your approach? 
Articles 3(1) and 3(5) of the Common Position require Member States to only share passport 
data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of protection for personal data and 
respect the fundamental rights and liberties regarding the automatic processing of personal 
data. The replies to the questionnaire show that only the Netherlands distinguishes between 
Interpol members, while all other Member States do not make such a distinction.  
The Member State that do not make such a distinction justified their approach on two 
grounds: (a) they consider that the information that is sent to Interpol, in particular the number 
of the passport, does not contain any personal data, and (b) they believe that they have an 
interest in locating any of their passports in any other country. Member States have clarified 
during the specialists meeting that the adequate level of protection for personal data and the 
respect of fundamental rights and liberties is considered as part of a risk assessment where 
they are faced with requests for confirmation of a positive identification or for provision of 
background information. 
3.5. What modalities has your MS agreed upon with Interpol for exchanging all 
passport data in its possession pursuant to Art. 3 (2) of CP 2005/69/JHA? For 
those Member States which have not agreed any such modalities, do you 
consider the Interpol regulations sufficient? For those Member States which 
answered the questionnaire contained in the 2006 Report: did you deploy the 
agreed modalities to effectively transfer legacy data? 
None of the Member States agreed special modalities for the exchange of passport data with 
Interpol. Member States seem to consider that the Interpol regulations and systems, like I-
24/7, provide sufficient safeguards. 
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3.6. Which competent law enforcement authorities have the right to query the 
Interpol database for the purpose of this CP in your Member Stare, according 
to Art. 3 (4) of CP 2005/69/JHA, and for which tasks do they consult the 
database? For those Member States which have already indicated such 
authorities in the replies to the questionnaire contained in the 2006 Report, 
please specify the tasks for which these authorities consult the Interpol 
database. 
In all cases police authorities have the right to query the Interpol database, except in Greece 
where only the Interpol National Bureau (NCB) has such right. It should be noted that in most 
Member States, the national intelligence services are considered to be part of the police 
authorities. 
In most Member States, in addition to the police, other law enforcement authorities have the 
right to query the Interpol database. For example, the Boarder Guard and the Customs Service 
have the right to query the database in Poland, the Border Guard and the Migration 
Department in Latvia, the Border Police in Italy and the Royal Military Police in the 
Netherlands. 
3.7. Has your Member State developed guidance and/or training on the cases where 
consultation of the Interpol database is deemed appropriate? For those Member 
States which have already indicated such development in the replies to the 
questionnaire contained in the 2006 Report, how does your Member State 
ensure that suitable appropriate consultation takes place? 
The replies suggest that 17 Member States have developed some guidelines or training for the 
use of the Interpol database. In some other Member States general guidance is given to 
officers who have access to the database. In general, however, Member States seem to imply 
that the database is self-explanatory and that mere availability of the database is enough. They 
suggest that there is no special need for law enforcement authorities to be trained or guided in 
the use of the Interpol database. 
3.8. Has your Member State already set up the infrastructure required to facilitate 
consultation according Art. 3(4) of the CP 2005/69/JHA)? 
• If the answer is positive, please provide a description of the relevant 
infrastructure. 
• For those Member States which replied to this question in the questionnaire 
contained in the 2006 Report, has there been a change in your situation since 
then? 
• Do your competent authorities have direct access to the Interpol database? If 
the access is indirect, please describe the workflow. 
Most Member States use the passport data in the Interpol database solely for investigation 
purposes. Only few Member States use the database for control purposes as well. The latter 
Member States provided or are in the process of providing access to border officers who are 
able to query the database manually or automatically at border crossings, using the I-24/7 and 
MIND & FIND tools provided by Interpol. 
The replies suggest that Member States have not given a particularly proactive interpretation 
to Article 3(4), and for the most part consider that the simple provision of potential access to 
competent authorities is sufficient to satisfy the requirement set out in the Article. This seems 
at odds with the text of the Article, and particularly with Member States’ obligation to 
“ensure” law enforcement authorities consult the Interpol database where appropriate.  
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3.9. In addition to compliance with national legislation on data protection, does your 
Member States take any other measure to ensure an adequate level of 
protection of personal data in the relevant Interpol member country and the 
respect of fundamental rights and liberties regarding the automatic processing 
of personal data pursuant to Article 3(5) of the CP 2005/69/JHA? Have there 
been any complaints from individuals emanating from such an exchange of 
data? 
The replies indicate that Member States do not take any special measures to ensure an 
adequate level of protection of personal data in the relevant Interpol member country and the 
respect of fundamental rights and liberties regarding the automatic processing of personal 
data, other than the Netherlands which limits the zones in which its data is available. All 
Member States consider that their national legislation is sufficient. Belgium, Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal consider that the passport data which is exchanged with 
Interpol is not personal data. 
Member State did not report incidents of any complaints from citizens in relation to the 
exchange of data with Interpol. 
3.10. Please provide statistics on the number of successful identifications (hits) made 
by your competent authorities against the Interpol database during the last 12 
months. What is the average time your competent authorities have to wait to 
obtain a confirmation of the successful identification (hit) and to obtain 
background information following a hit? 
Most Member States do not keep statistics of the number of positive identifications (hits) 
made by their competent authorities to the Interpol database, and were unable to provide any 
figures. Such data was made available by Interpol and showed that in the EU , between 
January and August 2007, there were 1,599 positive identifications, compared to 191 such 
identifications for the same period in 2005. 
According to the replies to the questionnaire, the average time that competent authorities have 
to wait to obtain confirmation of a successful identification varied between “seconds” and 
“months” or even “no confirmation at all”, even though 13 Member States were not able to 
provide such averages at all. 
The average time that competent authorities have to wait to obtain background information 
following a successful identification ranged between “24 hours” to “10 days” and to “no 
background information at all”. 17 Member States were not able to provide such statistics 
either because they do not have them or because the response time varies substantially 
depending on the third country concerned. 
3.11. Please provide statistics on the average number of requests for confirmation of 
a successful identification (hit) that you were asked to make by competent 
authorities of other Member States following a hit against the Interpol database 
during the last 12 months. What is the average time for responding to such a 
request for confirmation and to provide background information following a 
hit? 
The replies showed that 18 Member States do not keep statistics of the number of requests for 
confirmation of a successful identification that they receive from other Member States or from 
other Interpol member countries.The average time for responding to requests for confirmation 
of successful identifications varied between “minutes” and “few hours”, while the average 
time for providing background information was substantially longer, with one Member State 
noting that it may take up to 4 weeks. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS - SPECIFIC 
In order to provide a general overview of the operation of the Common Decision, it is again 
necessary to return to the 5 core obligations of the Member States, as identified earlier. 
4.1. To exchange all present and future passport data (as defined) with Interpol. 
At the time of writing this report, it is assumed that all Member States have implemented the 
Common Position and exchange passport data with Interpol. This is verified by Interpol. This 
result shows that since the 2006 Report, all Member States took positive steps to comply with 
their obligations.  
However, 3 Member States which do not exchange all the required types of passport data with 
Interpol. Namely, Poland provides data only on passports which are lost or stolen as a result 
of crime, Hungary only on stolen passports and Portugal only on blank stolen documents. On 
the other hand, in some cases Member States exceed the requirements of the Common 
Position by providing, for example, information on identity cards and driving licenses.  
Some Member States communicated some problems as regards the operation of the Common 
Position and the Interpol database. Latvia noted that there is no specific field in the Interpol 
database for "alien's passport" and that this poses a problem whenever such an entry needs to 
be made. Portugal raised similar concerns as regards fraudulent passports and Germany as 
regards misappropriated documents which are neither lost nor stolen. Member States 
suggested as a solution to these problems, the adoption of the FADO dictionary/list both for 
the Common Position, as well as for the Interpol database purposes. 
Irrespective of the identified problems, Interpol statistics show that entries to its database 
from the EU states for the period January to August 2007 were 11,237,207, compared to 
6,150,494 for the same period in 2005. These figures proved the substantial improvement in 
the exchange of data since the 2006 Report. Further, the entries of the EU Member States for 
the above period represent more than two thirds of the total number of entries, which 
demonstrates the huge growth in participation in this system, as well as the key role that EU 
states now play in enhancing Interpol’s capabilities.  
4.2. To ensure that such data is exchanged with Interpol immediately after it has 
been entered into the national database of SIS. 
Despite the fact that the replies of the Member States indicate a positive development since 
the 2006 Report, there is scope for further improvement in the implementation by the Member 
States.  
Only 11 Member States have achieved an immediate entry to the Interpol database, upon 
entry to the national database, and 2 other Member States are expected to be doing so very 
soon. 8 Member States exchange such data on a daily basis. However,, in the law enforcement 
field, time is of the essence and nothing short of an immediate entry can be considered 
sufficient. The provision of data on a monthly or weekly basis is totally inappropriate for the 
purposes of this Common Position. 
It is important that Member States exchange data with Interpol immediately, as this will 
enhance the value of the information, and collectively the value of the entire exchange 
mechanism. It is recommended that the concerned Member States take steps to remedy their 
non-compliance with this requirement of the Common Position. 
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4.3. To only share such data with Interpol members that have an adequate level of 
protection for personal data. 
Articles 3(1) and 3(5) of the Common Position request Member States to ensure that the 
exchange of passport data is subject to the requirement that the recipient Interpol country has 
an adequate level of protection of personal data and respect of fundamental rights regarding 
the automatic processing of personal data. Of all the Member States, only the Netherlands 
chose to limit the recipients of its passport data in order to comply with the above obligation 
of the Common Position. 
All other Member States invoke two reasons for not limiting such access to their passport 
data. First, the majority of Member States have indicated that they do not consider passport 
numbers to constitute ‘personal data’. Therefore, they believe that contributions to or 
consultations of the Interpol database will not result in any exchange of personal data. On this 
basis, most Member States do not believe to be breaching their obligations under the Common 
Position when they do not limit access to their passport data. Second, they consider that, from 
a law enforcement point of view and for the benefit of their citizens, they have an interest in 
knowing when one of their passports is detected in other parts of the world. All Member 
States believe that considerations of data protection adequacy and fundamental rights should 
come into play only at the stage of following-up a positive identification (hit), either to 
confirm it or to provide background information. Such follow-up is done on a case-by-case 
basis after carrying out a risk assessment of the situation based on proportionality and 
necessity. 
In the case blank passports, contribution to or consultation of the Interpol database will not 
result in any exchange of personal data, in which case the issue of ensuring an adequate level 
of data protection of the recipient does not come into play. In the case of issued passports, 
even if such contribution or consultation will involve only passport numbers, measures for the 
protection of personal data are necessary since data on an issued passport is information 
relating to an identifiable person. 
The fact that only one Member State makes the effort to distinguish with which countries to 
share passport data, shows great willingness on the part of the Member States to be relatively 
free with exchange of their data, and a lack of concern as to whether or not the countries they 
share data with have adequate personal data protection in place or not. Where no personal 
data is exchanged, this practice is obviously acceptable. In all other cases, the Commission 
recommends to Member States to ensure respect of the requirements as regards the protection 
of personal data from the very beginning of contributing to or consulting with the Interpol 
database and to chose to limit the recipients of its data on issued passports in order to comply 
with the obligation of Articles 3(1) and 3(5) of the Common Position. 
Further, Article 3(1) gives Member States the choice to only exchange passport data with 
other Interpol countries that also exchange such data. Even though most Member States 
considered that such reciprocal treatment is important, they again consider that it comes into 
play only at the stage of following-up a positive identification (hit). 
4.4. To ensure that their competent law authorities use the Interpol database to 
access such information when appropriate for the performance of their task and 
to set up the required infrastructures to facilitate consultation 
Despite the fact the Common Position imposes a proactive obligation on Member States to set 
up the required infrastructures and to ensure that their competent law enforcement authorities 
query the Interpol database where appropriate, they do not seem to have taken serious steps to 
comply with their obligation. 
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The replies seem to suggest that most Member States use the passport data in the Interpol 
database solely for investigation purposes, reflecting a prevailing attitude that by simply 
providing access to the Interpol database to its law enforcement authorities, they are 
‘ensuring’ that this valuable information resource is in fact used. In some Member States the 
database is accessible only via the NCBs, while some others have provided access to some 
specially authorised and trained police staff.  
However, in acting in such way, the Member States, in addition to non-complying with the 
Common Position, they are missing the real advantages of this database in the fight against 
serious and organised crime and terrorism.  
Only few Member States have extended the use of the database to control purposes. The 
provision of direct access to the database to border control officers is essential in order to 
maximise the benefits of the Common Position, since that is the point when a searched 
passport is likely to show up. 
Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, Cyprus, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Luxembourg and 
Ireland have provided or are in the process of providing access to border officers who are able 
to query the database manually or automatically at border crossings. Access is usually given 
using the I-24/7 and MIND&FIND tools provided by Interpol. This practice is recommended 
as the optimum use of the Interpol database. The Commission further recommends to Member 
States to provide the Commission with a list of “competent law enforcement authorities” 
under national law within the meaning of Articles 1and 3 of the Common Position. 
Even though it is clear that there is still a long way to go to achieve full compliance of all 
Member States with the obligation to provide access to the Interpol database, Interpol 
statistics show that there has been remarkable increase in the searches to the database which 
are carried out by the Member States. During the period January to August 2007 Member 
States have carried out 4,202,000 searches compared to 6,692 searches for the same period in 
2005. 
4.5. To ensure that they take up the required action in case that a positive 
identification (hit) occurred. 
Despite the fact that few Member States were able to provide statistics and averages in their 
replies, a dedicated session during the meeting of specialists was able to identify some issues 
and suggest some recommendations on this matter. 
The Member States drew a distinction between requests for a confirmation of a positive 
identification (hit) and the provision of background information where the request came as a 
result of an investigation or as a result of a border check. They all agreed that the speed of 
responding to the request is mostly relevant in the latter case where the rights of a citizen 
might be affected. 
One of the key issues which the Member States identified as of outmost importance in the 
efficient and speedy following-up of successful identifications is the increase in the staff of 
NCBs in order to enable them to work on a 24/7 basis, and to provide access to NCBs to their 
national passport databases and images of the passport holders,. These two steps would help 
increase dramatically the quick and efficient follow-up of requests for confirmation of 
successful identifications. 
The Member States also noted that they would welcome the adoption of some standards as 
regards such responses, like agreeing on a maximum response time. This could be adopted 
initially between Member States and later be extended to all Interpol member countries. 
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5. CONCLUSION - GENERAL  
We have noticed a substantial improvement in the operation of the Common Position since 
the 2006 Report. Member States have taken various steps in order to comply with their 
obligations. However, the implementation of the Common Position in the fullest sense of the 
term is still incomplete and requires a more proactive and committed effort on the part of the 
Member States. 
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Appendix 1 
INTERPOL STATISTICS 
1. Member State Participation in the Stolen Travel Document Database 
2005 2007 
18 27 
2. Individual Member State Contributions to the Stolen Travel Document 
Database 
Member State Number of Documents Contributed 
Austria 113,769 
Belgium 342,104 
Bulgaria 63 
Cyprus 3,743 
Czech Republic 611,814 
Denmark 120 
Estonia 100,126 
Finland 90,251 
France 15,179 
Germany 1,969,842 
Greece 24,194 
Hungary 17,996 
Ireland 88,021 
Italy 3,016,320 
Latvia 88,095 
Lithuania 341,738 
Luxembourg 4,496 
Malta 1,652 
Netherlands 1,641,360 
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Poland 626,826 
Portugal 10,386 
Romania 832,927 
Slovakia 65 
Slovenia 90,054 
Spain 224 
Sweden 163,541 
United Kingdom 1,042,301 
TOTAL 11,237,207 
3. Number of Documents Registered in the Stolen Travel Document Database 
 2005 2007 
EU Member States 6,394,305 11,237,207 
Non-EU States 2,449,300 4,484,545 
Total 8,843,605 15,721,752 
4. Number of Searches Made of the Stolen Travel Document Database 
 2005 2007 
EU Member States 8520 4,202,000 
Non-EU States 34,796 6,232,469 
Total 43,316 10,434,469 
5. Number of Successful Hits on the Stolen Travel Document Database 
 2005 2007 
EU Member States 381 1,599 
Non-EU States 457 2,180 
Total 838 3,779 
 
